Credential theft

Advanced eBPF Rootkit LinkPro Evade Detection in Linux Systems via Magic TCP Packets

Overview: LinkPro rootkit targets GNU/Linux systems: LinkPro is a newly discovered Linux rootkit that leverages eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) technology to stealthily hide its presence on infected systems. The sophisticated Linux rootkit linkpro was uncovered by Synacktiv CSIRT during an investigation of a compromised AWS infrastructure and evade detection in Linux Systems.

This threat was deployed in an AWS environment after attackers exploited a vulnerable Jenkins server to distribute a malicious Docker image containing a Rust downloader that fetched a memory-resident vShell backdoor. This rootkit’s use of eBPF, a legitimate kernel feature, makes detection challenging in Linux as it operates at a low level within the Linux kernel. 

Leveraging extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) technology, where linkpro backdoor evades detection by hiding its processes and network activity, activating remotely via a “magic packet.”

Source: www.synacktiv.com 

Issues Details: The attack, originating from a vulnerable Jenkins server, deployed a malicious Docker image across AWS EKS clusters, enabling credential theft and lateral movement. This highlights the misuse of ebpf for advanced persistent threats (apts) in cloud environments. 

The LinkPro rootkit targets GNU/Linux systems, exploiting eBPF kernel capabilities to achieve stealth and remote activation.

It embeds multiple ELF modules, including two eBPF programs that hook into critical kernel system calls like getdents and sys_bpf to hide files, processes, and its own presence from detection tools.

If kernel support for these hooks is unavailable, LinkPro falls back to user-space concealment by loading a malicious shared library via /etc/ld.so.preload. This sophisticated rootkit deploys an advanced network packet filtering mechanism, activating only upon receiving a specific “magic packet” (a TCP SYN with a window size of 54321), allowing the attacker to control the system covertly. 

LinkPro masquerades as the legitimate systemd-resolved service for persistence and uses encrypted channels such as HTTP, DNS tunneling, and raw TCP/UDP for command and control. Its design enables attackers to execute arbitrary commands, perform file operations, and establish proxy tunnels, making it a highly adaptable and stealthy tool for persistent intrusions targeting cloud-native Linux systems. 

Attack Flow 

IOCs 

IOC Type Indicator Description 
  Network /api/client/file/download?Path=… URL used to download tools/payloads onto the compromised host. 
/reverse/handshake /reverse/heartbeat /reverse/operation Endpoints the implant calls in reverse mode to receive operator commands. 
18.199.101.111 Destination IP used by LinkPro in forward (active) mode. 
   File /etc/systemd/system/systemd-resolveld.service Malicious systemd service file named to look like systemd-resolved. 
/root/.tmp~data.ok Location/name of the LinkPro binary, disguised as a system file. 
/usr/lib/.system/.tmp~data.resolveld Alternate disguised location for the LinkPro binary. 
/etc/libld.so Malicious library loaded via /etc/ld.so.preload as a fallback concealment method. 
   Host Systemd-resolveld Fake service name intended to be mistaken for systemd-resolved. 
Conf_map eBPF map holding the internal port used by the Knock module. 
Knock_map eBPF map containing authorized IP addresses for the Knock module. 
Main_ebpf_progs eBPF map listing programs that the Hide module manages. 
Pids_to_hide_map eBPF map listing process IDs the rootkit hides. 
Hashes D5b2202b7308b25bda8e106552dafb8b6e739ca62287ee33ec77abe4016e698b Passive linkpro backdoor 
1368f3a8a8254feea14af7dc928af6847cab8fcceec4f21e0166843a75e81964 Active linkpro backdoor 
B11a1aa2809708101b0e2067bd40549fac4880522f7086eb15b71bfb322ff5e7 Ld_Preload module (libld.so) 
B8c8f9888a8764df73442ea78393fe12464e160d840c0e7e573f5d9ea226e164 Hide ebpf module 
364c680f0cab651bb119aa1cd82fefda9384853b1e8f467bcad91c9bdef097d3 Knock ebpf module 
0da5a7d302ca5bc15341f9350a130ce46e18b7f06ca0ecf4a1c37b4029667dbb Vget downloader 

Recommendations

Here are some recommendations below 

  • Patch the vulnerable Jenkins server (CVE-2024-23897) to prevent initial access. 
  • Restrict public exposure of CI/CD tools and enforce strict network segmentation. 
  • Monitor for suspicious Docker container deployments and unexpected host filesystem mounts. 
  • Watch for unusual or unauthorized eBPF program activity using kernel auditing tools. 
  • Regularly update Linux kernels and apply available security patches. 

Conclusion: 
The LinkPro rootkit is anadvanced Linux malware that uses eBPF at the kernel level to stay hidden and persist on systems.

It spreads through Jenkins vulnerabilities, container escapes and remote activation,  highlighting the critical vigilance organizations must maintain to continuously monitor and secure their environments.

To protect against it, companies should focus on timely patching and monitoring suspicious activities. 

References

Zero-Day Vulnerability in Windows Exposes NTLM Credentials

Summary

OEM

Microsoft

Severity

Critical

Date of Announcement

2024-12-12

CVE

Not yet assigned

Exploited in Wild

No

Patch/Remediation Available

Yes (No official patch)

Advisory Version

1.0

Vulnerability Name

NTLM Zero-Day

Overview

A recently discovered zero-day vulnerability in Windows, enables attackers to steal user credentials through a malicious file viewed in File Explorer. This “clickless” exploit bypasses the need for user interaction, creating significant security risks. While Microsoft investigates, 0patch has released an unofficial micropatch to mitigate the threat. Users are advised to apply the patch or implement mitigations to reduce exposure.

Vulnerability Name

CVE ID

Product Affected

Severity

NTLM zero-day

Not Yet Assigned

Microsoft Windows

Critical

Technical Summary

CVE ID

System Affected

Vulnerability Details

Impact

Not Yet Assigned

Windows 7 to 11 (24H2), Server 2008 R2 to 2022

A zero-day vulnerability that allows NTLM credential theft by viewing a malicious file in File Explorer. The flaw forces an outbound NTLM connection, leaking NTLM hashes. Exploitation requires no user interaction beyond viewing a malicious file, which can be delivered through shared folders, USB drives, or malicious downloads in the browser's default folder.

Enables attackers to steal NTLM credentials and  gain unauthorized access of the affected systems.

Remediations

  • Apply the 0patch Micropatch:
    • Register for a free account at 0patch Central.
    • Install the 0patch agent to automatically receive the micropatch.
  • Disable NTLM Authentication:
    • Navigate to Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options in Group Policy.
    • Configure “Network security: Restrict NTLM” policies to limit NTLM usage. 

General Recommendations

  • Only enable patches or configurations after testing them on non-critical devices to ensure minimal impact.
  • Stay updated on Microsoft’s response and the availability of an official patch through trusted news sources or Microsoft’s advisories.
  • Inform users about the risks of handling unfamiliar files and downloading content from untrusted sources.
  • Monitor systems for suspicious NTLM-related activity.
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